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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
R O B E R T B. H A N S E N ,
Plaintiff .Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
vs.

PETROF TRADING
COMPANY, INC.,

Case No.
13276

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
AND CROSS APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
Appellant's statement is incomplete in that it neglected to state that the suit was for collection of an
attorney's fee and that there is also a cross-appeal because the lower court based its judgment in favor of
Respondent on the basis of $20.00 per hour rather than
$25.00 per hour and because the judgment did not include any interest.
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D I S P O S I T I O N O F T H E L O W E R COURT
Appellant states that its Counter Claim was dismissed because it was filed beyond the period of the
Statute of Limitations. In fact, however, the lower
court dismissed the Counter Claim on two grounds,
each of which was correct, and would sustain the trial
court's judgment in this respect, namely (1) Appellant
failed to prove or offer to prove facts sufficient to constitute a claim upon which judgment could be rendered
in its favor on its Counter Claim; (2) The acts complained of were known or should have been known to
the plaintiff more than four years prior to the filing of
said Counter Claim (R. 128, Finding of Fact # 6 ) .
With respect to Respondent's Cross Appeal, Appellant contends that interest was denied on the grounds
that plaintiff failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of the Consumer Credit Act and on the
ground that interest was not included in the periodic
billings to Appellant. In fact, however, the trial court
denied interest on the principal sum found due by
reason of the fact it found that there was "no express
understanding with respect to the defendant being
charged interest in connection with this case" (R. 128,
Finding # 7 ) .
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Respondent in his cross-appeal seeks to have the
judgment granted in the lower court corrected by computating the fee at $25.00 per hour and by allowing
interest on the principal sum.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Many, if not most, of the statements set forth in
Appellant's Statement of Facts is the defendant's version of what took place and much, if not most, of the
so-called facts have no support in the record and it is
therefore not surprising that Appellant has failed to
comply with the provisions of Rule 75 P (2) with respect to "giving reference to the pages of the record
supporting such statements."
As to the first paragraph, the first two sentences are
correct, As to the third sentence the dismissal was to be
predicted on a payment to be made in the future rather
than one in the past and the order of dismissal was not
made until the payment had been effected. As to the
fourth and last statement it is not true that the representation of defendant's counsel (Keith Rooker) was faulty
but it was discovered that even after the payment referred to above the amount in dispute exceeded the Federal
Court jurisdictional amount of $10,000.00 because the
Appellant's claim was for more money than was prayed
for in its complaint.
The second and third paragraphs are correct.
As to the fourth paragraph the so-called facts were
not introduced in evidence as Appellant failed to offer
to prove any facts which would have been sufficient to
constitute a malpractice claim against Respondent. Had
such proof been attempted, however, Respondent would
have proved that all of his files in Case 116-67 were
turned over to Attorney Arthur H . Nielsen before
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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said case went to trial in the Federal District Court
and that the files contained all of the information with
respect to the disposition referred to in Appellant's
Brief.
The fifth paragraph is correct.
As to the sixth paragraph, it is not true that the
Amended Reply to Counter Claim was received by
Appellant's counsel less than one week before the trial
of the matter as it was mailed in Salt Lake City, Utah,
on August 28th, a Monday, and would have been received by at least August 30th, which was more than
seven days prior to the trial on September 7th and in
any event there is no proof in the record that Appellant's counsel had notice of less than a week's time and
Appellant's counsel did not claim surprise at the trial
nor did he move for a continuance if he felt that it
would prejudice his case to have it heard on September
7th as to was.
As to the seventh paragraph this is correct except
for the implication that Respondent was seeking to
obtain judgment for a sum in excess of the correct
amount as he had submitted corrected billing statement
on which he sought judgment. Adjustment both upwards and downwards were made in the amount set
forth on statements made in billing prior to the commencement of this action.
As to the eighth paragraph it is not correct that
the court limited the purpose of Appellant's proffer
of evidence to the question of determining whether the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations. I t is
true that the Court found that the Appellant should
have discovered the acts upon which he did claim respondent was liable. The Court not only found that
the Appellant corporation should have discovered the
acts of "alleged professional negligence" prior to August 19, 1972, but also more than four years prior to that
date. The dismissal of the Counter Claim, however, was
not grounded solely or even primarily on that basis
as the Court first found that the proffer did not state
a claim upon which relief could be granted (R. 128,
Finding # 6 ) .
As to the ninth paragraph the Court did not make
the Finding set forth in the first sentence thereof and
the denial of interest was not based thereon but upon
the Court's finding that there was no express agreement
on the part of the defendant to pay interest (R. 128,
Finding # 7 ) .
As to the tenth paragraph the Respondent did not
accept the sum paid in satisfaction of judgment. On
the contrary Respondent in its praecipe to the Sheriff of
Salt Lake County expressly stated that it was not receiving any sum collected on the Execution issued on
the Judgment as satisfaction. In any event these facts
occurred subsequent to the Judgment appealed from
and are not of record.
The last paragraph is correct.
Understandably the Appellant has not set forth
the facts as they relate to Respondent's cross-appeal.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I n fact, it ignores the cross-appeal except in its designation of the parties where it is correctly noted that
Respondent is also the "Cross-Appellant". Since the
facts regarding the cross-appeal are also the argument
in support of the cross-appeal, they will be set forth
under Point I I I to avoid undue repetition.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E T R I A L COURT D I S M I S S E D
A P P E L L ANT'S COUNTERCLAIM
B E C A U S E A P P E L L A N T F A I L E D TO
O F F E R P R O O F O F A N Y F A C T S ON
W H I C H A J U D G M E N T FOR MALPRACTICE COULD BE BASED.
Appellant's counterclaim was dismissed primarily
because appellant did not allege nor offer to prove any
facts which would state a claim upon which relief could
be granted (R. 128, Finding # 6 ) . The fact that the
dismissal was also based upon the Statute of Limitations does not nullify that fact and either ground alone
is sufficient to justify the dismissal.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
FOUND THAT THE LIMITATIONS
W O U L D BAR APPELLANT'S CLAIM
AS A MATTER OF L A W BASED ON
FACTS ASSERTED BY APPELLANT.
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Respondent agrees with Appellant that the applicable statute of limitations for professional malpractice
cases against attorneys in Utah is the four year period
set forth in Sec. 78-12-25 U.C.A. 1953 and Respondent
also agrees that the party asserting that defense to a
claim has the affirmative burden of pleading and proving it. Respondent disputes Appellant's claim, however,
that the trial court shifted the burden to Appellant to
prove that the Statute of Limitation did not apply.
Respondent wishes to point out that Appellant fails
to cite any part of the record in which the Court did
as Appellant alleges in this regard.
Respondent accepts the decisions of this Court in
the case of Christiansen v. Bees, 20 U.2d 199, 436 P.2d
435 (1968) and Holland v. Morton, 10 U.2d 390 353
P.2d 989 (1960) as good law but wishes to point out
that the facts in those cases are entirely different from
the facts in this case, the basic distinction being that the
conduct of malpractice in the case of the doctor and
lawyer respectively in those cases was not known during
the applicable limitation period whereas in this case it
was known, assuming arguendo that there was in fact
any acts of malpractice in the instant case, an assumption which the Respondent vigorously denies and which
denial was found to be correct in the trial court since
Appellant's alleged facts in his Offer of Proof would
not constitute a claim for malpractice even if they were
true. The same is true with respect to the New York
case of Wilson v. Econom § 6 Misc.2d 272, 288 N.Y.
Supp. 2d 381 (1968).
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This difference in facts is best highlighted by contrasting the situation in the instant case with what Appellant in its brief on page eleven says is true, "in most
cases". There Appellant's brief reads as follows: "In
most cases, an attorney has exclusive custody of records,
evidence, research, and other pertinent materials to his
client's case which are not usually available to others
having the professional qualifications to determine
whether an action of professional negligence has occurred." In this case Attorney Arthur H . Nielsen who
tried the case which Respondent was initially employed
in and who ultimately prevailed in the main in that case,
was the one who had the exclusive custody of records,
evidence, research, and pertinent materials to Respondent's case and he certainly had and has the professional
qualifications to determine whether an act of professional
negligence had occurred.
The Christiansen case stands for the proposition
that it is for the trier of the facts, (here Judge Stewart
M. Hanson who was sitting without a jury) to determine
whether or not the patient knew or should have known
that a foreign body was left in his body more than four
years prior to the commencement of this action so that
a Motion for Summary Judgment ought not to be
granted. Here the Court's found that the Appellant
knew or should have known of any of the acts complained
of in his offer of proof more than four months prior to
the filing of its Cross Claim (R. 128, Finding #6) and
that Finding is amply supported by the evidence introDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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duced in this case and particularly in light of Appellant's offer of proof. (R. 270-277)
Certainly, that case lends no support to the implication made in Appellant's Brief that the trial court is
not entitled to make the factual determination that it
did here without receiving the proffered evidence after
receiving the Offer of Proof which it found insufficient
to sustain Appellant's contention. In any event we are
not left in doubt as to what that proof might have been
even beyond the scope of the offer of proof as Appellant's president has made a very extensive statement
of what he contends to be the facts as set forth in his
Affidavit in Appellant's Motion to open case, Take
Testimony and Enter New Judgment under Rule 59,
U.R.C.P. (R. 146-216). Without unduly burdening the
Court with a detailed analysis of that Affidavit and
why it fails to show that the Appellant asserted no
claim upon which relief could be granted and that even
if the alleged acts constituted malpractice that they were
in fact known or should have been known more than
four years prior to the filing of the Cross Claim, Respondent will simply point out that Appellant's Brief
failed to refer this Court to those allegations in that 11
page Affidavit with 16 Exhibits attached upon which
the lower Court could have found such malpractice
and that its claim was presented within the time provided by law.
As to the Holland case the plaintiff there based
his claim on fraud and the main thrust of that case as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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contended for by the Appellant here is that the client was
entitled to trust in his attorney and was not charged
with notice of a deed being recorded in the absence of
his counsel advising him of this fact. The findings and
Judgment of the court below in this case are not in any
particular in conflict with that holding.
I n a proper case a defendant-appellant might well
urge this Court to overrule its holding in the Christiansen
case where its application might subject a professional
to liability long after it would be fair to hold him answerable but that is not the case here as the Respondent is
not urging that the termination rule be applied here in
order to get off his prospective liability long before it
would cease under the Christiansen discovery rule.
POINT III
T H E COURT E R R E D I N F I N D ING THAT T H E F E E ARRANGEM E N T W A S $20.00 P E R H O U R W H E N
ALL T H E E V I D E N C E IN T H E RECORD E S T A B L I S H E D T H A T I T W A S
$25.00 P E R HOUR.
The facts in regard to this point are as follows:
(1) On June 22, 1967 the Appellant paid the Respondent $100.00 as a retainer on certain legal services and
$25.00 in court costs (Exhibit 10-P, last page). (2) On
December 23, 1967 the Respondent billed Appellant for
$627.50, credited the $100.00 payment and requested
payment of the balance of $527.50. (Exhibit 10-P, last
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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three pink sheets) Said statement stated that all of the
services amounted to 25.1 hours. (3) On February 3,
1968 the Respondent billed Appellant for $1,667.32
(Exhibit 10-P, first two pink pages). On that bill it
stated expressly that 31.1 hours were being billed at the
rate of $25.00 per hour for services of the plaintiff
personally and 23.3 hours for the services of David A.
Goodwell, an associate of the plaintiff, at the rate of
$15.00 per hour. (4) On January 5, 1968 the Respondent paid the sum of $500.00 on account of the aforesaid
services. (5) On June 1, 1970, Respondent billed Appellant for $2,178.12 for 34.85 additional hours and
based that billing at the rate of $25.00 per hour (see
Exhibit 10-P, last gold page). (6) No payment was
made pursuant to that statement and on July 31, 1970
the Respondent filed suit for payment of the said
$2,178.12 together with interest thereon at the rate of
6% per annum from various dates when parts of the
billings were due and unpaid. (R-l) On December 7,
1970 the Respondent expressly admitted in his Answer
that the amount of compensation which the Appellant
agreed to pay Respondent for the aforesaid legal services was $25.00 per hour for services performed by
Respondent personally and $15.00 per hour for services
performed by David A. Goodwill (R-5, paragraph
one). On December 7, 1971 the Appellant filed an
Answer in which he denied the basis of conmpensation
alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint (R-20, Second Defense) (7) On the 16th day of October, 1971 the ResponDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dent served a Request for Admissions on Appellant
which requested that he admit that "the initial fee
arrangement obligated the defendant to pay plaintiff $25.00 per hour for services rendered by him
in connection with the aforesaid law suit". (R-8)
(8) On December 15, 1971 Respondent through
its attorney admitted said Request for Admission
(R-30, # 8 ) (9) On October 16, 1971 the Respondent served on Appellant the following written
Interrogatory: "State what the basis of the compensation to the plaintiff was according to the initial agreement and any subsequent modification for services
rendered by the plaintiff and by his associate, David A.
Goodwell." (R-10, #2) On December 15, 1971, the
Respondent answered that Interrogatory as follows:
"$25.00 for services rendered by plaintiff, $15.00 for
services of David A. Goodwell. See answers above for
further explanation." (R-32, #2) (10) Previous to all
of the foregoing transactions, the Respondent had offered on July 26, 1965, to render services for the Appellant for the sum of $20.00 per hour (E. 2-P) and it
was on the basis of this letter that the trial court based its
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant (R-127, # 1 ) (11) In explaining Ex. 2-P at
trial the Respondent pointed out that he had increased
his hourly charges from $20.00 per hour to $25.00 per
hour sometime after July 26, 1965, and prior to the time
that the services in question were undertaken. In support
of that explanation Respondent offered a copy of a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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billing to the Appellant dated Feb. 13, 1967, which
showed that he had billed respondent $25.00 per hour
for services in December, 1966 and January 1967. That
exhibit also referred to a letter to Attorney Lewis F .
Sherman, which is Exh. 7-P which also showed that the
billing was being made on the basis of $25.00 per hour.
The respondent paid both charges by paying Respondent the sum of $193.62 prior to the Appellant employing the Respondent to perform the services which are
the subject matter of this law suit. (Ex. 8-P, R. 242)
POINT IV
T H E COURT E R R E D IN NOT
A L L O W I N G I N T E R E S T ON T H E
P R I N C I P A L SUM F O U N D TO B E
O W I N G F R O M A P P E L L A N T TO R E SPONDENT.
The trial court, as noted in the Statement of Facts,
denied Respondent interest on the basis that there was
no express agreement that interest would be charged
if payment was not made upon receipt of billings (R128, # 7 ) . Respondent respectfully submits that there
is no legal authority which would justify the denial of
interest on that basis and Appellant apparently concedes this to be the case as it seeks to justify the denial
of interest on some vague reference to the Consumer
Credit Code.
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Sec. 15-1-1 U.C.A. 1953 provides, inter alia: "The
legal rate of interest for the loan or forebearance of any
money good or things in action shall be 6% per annum."
There was no loan here but there certainly was forebearance.
In Godbe v. Young, 15Ut. 55; 15 Wall 562."
(1890) this court said on page 60: "When interest, as
such, should be allowed by courts as a matter of law,
and when it may be allowed as damages by juries in
descretion are questions that have been much discussed
by courts and commentators. We are satisfied, however,
that in regard to the first of these questions, the rule
most firmly found on record, and reason, and best supported by authority is, 'that in actions of contract interest is no longer in the discretion of the jury, but a
matter of right and as essential to legal indemnity as
the principal sum or ascertained value to which it is
instant.' (Sedgwick on Damages, 5th Edition, 432, note
2 and citing nine cases from New York and elsewhere
in support thereof.) Here, of course, this was an action
based on an oral contract and hence the interest should
have been accorded to the Respondent as a matter of
right and of law.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully urges this Court to remand
this case to the lower Court with instructions to amend
the Findings to show that the hourly rate for the judgment should be $25.00 per hour rather than $20.00 per
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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hour and that interest is due to the Respondent on the
principal sum at the rate of 6% per annum even though
there was no express agreement with respect to interest
and that the judgment should be amended accordingly
and that this Court should affirm the trial Court's dismissal of Appellant's Counter Claim on either the merits
or on the bar of the limitations of actions or on both.
Respectfully submitted,
R O B E R T B. H A N S E N
Respondent
838 18th Avenue
Salt Lake iCty, Utah
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